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In his book Ignorance, Peter Unger puts forward scenarios meant to illustrate the skeptical view of 
knowledge and why it is wrong to be certain. In my paper I will examine three sorts of these examples 
using tools of quantitative analysis: the Ink Bottle, the Voice, and the Scientist, taking each of these to be 
a typical example of a skeptical scenario. After presenting possible skeptical objections to this sort of 
analysis, I end by concluding that methods of quantitative analysis stand up to the sort of skepticism that 
Unger provides and that under most quantitative analysis provides us with a better tool for understanding 





In his book Ignorance, Peter Unger argues for philosophical skepticism. His argument 
centers around the belief that knowledge implies certainty and that certainty is the same 
thing is dogmatism – and that it is wrong for anyone to be dogmatic regarding their 
knowledge. Arguing this, he brings to light several examples where he thinks that we 
would not be able to claim certainty. I will examine his examples of Malcom’s Ink 
Bottle and that of a Voice telling us we are in a false world through probabilistic 
reasoning and examine the skeptical critique of this analysis. Ultimately, I conclude 
that rather than lead us into a skeptical worldview, these examples show that skeptical 
scenarios can be examined by quantitative analysis in a manner that amounts to 
knowledge of the world as it exists. In this article, when I say ‘skeptic’ I will be 
specifically talking about Unger’s skepticism, although the point may reach more 
broadly than that. 
 
Before the examination of these examples I would like to ensure that the reader 
understands their importance for Unger’s skepticism. Unger’s argument for skepticism 
regarding knowledge is decidedly normative, holding that if one is certain of a 
proposition, one is not at all open to the prospect of any new evidence against the 
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proposition.1 Unger also holds that we regard knowledge in terms of certainty, arguing 
that there is no difference between the statements “S knows P” and “S is certain of P.” 
Unger thinks that to be closed to new evidence is to be dogmatic and that it is wrong to 
be unwilling to accept new evidence regarding a proposition. As such, Unger believes 
that it is wrong for any person to believe that they have knowledge. Given that these are 
the key features of his argument, one might wonder what importance, if any, examples 
such as the Ink Bottle have for Unger or if a quantitative analysis of the examples are 
minor point which does not address the skeptic. 
 
I argue that Unger’s examples are extremely important for his arguments. Unger tells us 
that any knowledge we have is suspect and provides us with his examples so that we 
might imagine circumstances where we would have to admit to a lack of certainty 
regarding our knowledge of the world around us. If there were no imaginable 
circumstance where the skeptical hypothesis might be shown to be true, it could be 
inconceivable as a hypothesis- as Putnam claims in his article “Brains in Vats.” As 
such, Unger is attempting to illustrate that there are circumstances in which we would 
re-evaluate our knowledge of the world so drastically that we cannot claim any 
knowledge following such scenarios. Moreover, because no experience we could have 
is capable of demonstrating that we will never find ourselves in a skeptical scenario 
regarding any particular item of knowledge, we cannot – even prior to the experience of 
such a scenario – be certain of anything. As we cannot have certainty, it follows that 
we cannot have knowledge. Unger’s examples are meant to clearly demonstrate this to 
the reader and so are vitally important to his skepticism. 
 
 
The Ink Bottle 
 
Unger’s example of the ink bottle is meant to illustrate that even with a small level of 
uncertainty, we cannot claim to have knowledge.2 Since one cannot be certain that an 
ink bottle is not a deadly chemical weapon, no matter how unlikely it is, one cannot 
make a knowledge claim regarding other phenomenon which are uncertain, no matter 
how unlikely it is. To examine this claim, we should attempt to discern what, if 
anything, can be precisely known about an uncertain proposition. One such tool for 
probabilistic reasoning is Bayes’ Theorem. Bayes’ Theorem tells us that we may 
determine the likelihood of a proposition by multiplying its anterior and posterior 
probabilities, and dividing these by all instances under consideration. To examine this 
specific question, let us assume that the ink well in front of me is a 2 ounce bottle. If it 
were a deadly chemical weapon from a government agency, it would have to have 
come from the government’s supply of chemical weapons. This supply first came into 
                                               
1
 Unger, Peter. Ignorance. (Oxford University Press, 1975) 121. 
 
2
 Unger, 125. 
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being with stockpiles in World War I and has consisted of 31,100 metric tones of 
chemical weapons, 75% of which have been destroyed as of 2010. As far as records 
show, none of this stockpile has ever ended up in an ink bottle.3 Still, let us say that 
there is one potential instance of this in a 94 year period, for the sake of argument. The 
odds of a given instance being that instance (the posterior probability) given the 
destroyed instances (which cannot end up in ink bottles) is 1.37*10^-9. Let us assume 
that the ink bottle appears to be from a company that engages in six-sigma industry-
standard manufacturing practices, so 99.99933% of what they produce is properly sold 
as ink, giving the “ink” postulate a probability of .9999933.4 We will assume that all 
ink bottles distributed by a given company are under consideration, with the company 
in question being identifiable merely by looking at the ink bottle in question. Running 
those numbers through the theorem, we find that the likelihood of the proposition 
regarding ink bottles from a given company over a 94 year period to be 1.36*10^-9, or 
around 1 in a trillion. Given the current rate of destruction for chemical weapons in the 
United States (45% in 2007, 75% in 2010) we can expect the stockpile to exist for 
roughly the next 5-10 years at the outside. The probability of one of these years being 
the year some of these weapons get into an inkwell is then 14.55-7.27*10^-10, meaning 
that the odds of this happening even once among all instances is somewhere between 1 
to 6-13 trillion against, depending on how fast the stockpile is disposed of. 
 
There is one problem with the above calculation: I assumed one instance of such an ink 
bottle existing while this has never been reported. Because I assumed an instance where 
none was present, the relative odds of the event occurring could be less than one 
instance, giving us a posterior probability of <1.37*10^-9. As I find there to be nothing 
logically necessary about an inkwell not being a secret chemical weapon, I will also 
assume that it is higher than zero. This means that the odds of this event occurring to 
anyone might be as low as 1 to 6 trillion against but will be no better. 
 
 
Objections to the Probability 
 
Unger is likely to challenge this use of probability on several grounds. First, he won’t 
concede that the prior cases are known. Second, he won’t concede that the mathematics 
is known. Finally, even if the prior cases and the mathematics were known, he would 
object to the probability as a knowledge claim. Unger would likely concede that this 
methodology manages to be non-dogmatic as it updates on the evidence at hand: 
namely, if the evidence showed the world to be another way, we would think otherwise. 
                                               
3
 US Army Chemical Materials Agency Web Page. (Chemical Materials Agency. December 6th 2010. US 
Army. December 15th, 2010) http://www.cma.army.mil/. 
 
4
 Figures were based on those of the Lyson Ink Company (www.lyson.com) but the example works for a 
given ink-production company of relative size. 
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To address the question of whether or not the prior instances can be considered a 
‘knowledge claim’ we must first address how we are constraining the problem within 
the scenario proposed. In Unger’s inkwell scenario, we are not judging between two 
propositions about the ‘metaphysical’ nature of the inkwell in any deep-sense – i.e., 
whether or not reality really contains objects such as inkwells. All we are assuming is 
that, in regard to the question posed, that there are a number of things perceived as 
inkwells and a number of things perceived as chemical weapons, and that these objects 
can be distinguished from one another. Note that this is entirely compatible with such 
objects being ‘unreal’ in a certain sense, such as in Unger’s ‘scientist’ scenario: the 
‘real world’ might not have inkwells or anything like them, but still a person in such a 
simulation could distinguish a chemical weapon from an inkwell. By assuming the 
existence of inkwells to compare the two theories for any given inkwell, we need only 
assume that the things in the example scenario; such as inkwells, chemical weapons, 
and government agencies, refer to something in terms of the scenario. 
 
The skeptic’s question of the ‘knowledge’ of the mathematics involved may be 
approached in a similar fashion. The question under consideration is whether a given 
object is an inkwell or a chemical weapon. By assuming that there are such objects in 
the scenario, and that they may be distinguished, we may assume that there are 
countable instances and that there is some probability that a given object is an inkwell 
or a chemical weapon. Note that this only refers to the scenario in question: a ‘real 
world’ might exist such that mathematics and probability are not valid. However, there 
is no reason in terms of inkwells and chemical weapons to doubt the quantitative 
analysis. 
 
Finally, Unger would call into question whether or not the probability counts as a 
knowledge claim. If proposed the question “Is this object before me an inkwell or a 
chemical weapon?”, the answer, “The probability of it being a chemical weapon as 
opposed to an inkwell is 1 to 6 trillion against,” doesn’t seem to grant us any certainty. 
Neither case would violate the probability: I am still uncertain as to whether the object 
is actually an inkwell. I will grant this to the skeptic but say that, given the assumed 
existence of inkwells and chemical weapons in the scenario, we can know the 
probability. That is to say, our knowledge of the uncertain state of the inkwell is known 
with certainty given the scenario as presented. 
 
 
The Strange Voice 
 
Unger’s example of the “voice” represents a stronger skeptical proposition: a case 
where one experiences a voice which seems to indicate a great number of facts about 
the world as he has seen it, a number of completely accurate predictions about 
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outlandish future events, and the information that the “world” being experienced in the 
example is an illusion and that even the voice he is hearing is a product of that illusion.5 
Note that even within his skeptical example, this voice is using Bayes’ theorem: 
bringing up a number of examples that bring past events into question (marking them as 
potential false positives) and bringing weight to the skeptical scenario (providing 
examples of disconfirming evidence) to make its point. So at least within the scenario 
the voice is attempting to use Bayes’ theorem as a persuasive tool, albeit informally. 
 
For us to evaluate a model such as this under Bayes’ Theorem, we must provide a solid 
question regarding the models involved: the skeptical model and the non-skeptical 
model, and see which one predicts the above scenario with better accuracy. In this way, 
we may evaluate the models in terms of what we should believe, given a specific 
experience. The skeptical model suggests that one is individually chosen, either as the 
only real person in the world or as one of many real persons in the world, to experience 
the voice and the events that follow to prove to this person that the world is false. The 
non-skeptical model would suggest that experiences of the above nature would be due 
to some sort of delusion or psychosis.6 To produce a question that would distinguish 
these scenarios, I will suggest the following: How likely is this event for a given person 
in either model? The model where it is more likely would seem to explain the event 
better. 
 
So how likely is each? Finding the probability for the skeptical scenario is, in this 
sense, rather easy. There are over 6.77 billion humans on the planet at the time of this 
writing. For simplicity’s sake, I will assume that only human beings are under 
consideration. The likelihood of a specific individual having this experience, given that 
it is happening to only one person, is then a little less than 1 to 6.77 billion, or 
1.47x10^-10, assuming that the scientists choose to share the real nature of the world 
with this person. If the scientists do not choose to do so, then the probability of a given 
person experiencing this will, of course, be zero.  
 
In the Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, Eaton and colleagues found that bizarre 
delusions were reported by as much as 2% of the general population.7 Moreover, Dutch 
NEMESIS study found that only 12% of those who self-reported delusions were 
                                               
5
 Unger, 125 
 
6
 Unger, in fact, admits this to be what one might assume on page 126. Thus, I will assume it to be the 
counterfactual model that he would deny. 
 
7
 Eaton WW, Romanoski A, Anthony JC, and Nestadt G. “Screening for psychosis in the general 
population with a self-report interview.” (Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease.: Nov. 1991; Vol. 179: 
Issue 11) 690-91. 
Res Cogitans (2011) 2                                                                                                             Parisi | 127 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
diagnosable as having a delusional disorder.8 So if one were to experience Unger’s 
scenario and was not diagnosed with a condition that produced delusions, we would 
assign the event a probability of 1.76%. The question then becomes, are these delusions 
independent or dependent: that is to say, how likely is it that a person who experiences 
one delusion will experience another, related delusion. If we assume them to be 
completely dependent, we would keep the probability at 1.76%, but if independent we 
find a probability of 9.59*10^-8. So the odds of a given person experiencing a scenario 
like Unger’s, according to our psychological model, is between 1.76*10^-2 and 
9.59*10^-8. So we find that even at its least probable point, it is an order of magnitude 
more likely that a person experiencing Unger’s scenarios is experiencing a delusion 
rather than having a unique, skeptical experience. 
 
 
Objections to Comparative Analysis 
 
As with the inkwell, Unger would doubt this analysis as producing a knowledge claim. 
He would question the probability given for the ‘voice,’ and would also say that the 
whole scenario is not subject to quantitative analysis because, unlike the inkwell 
example above, the ‘voice’ specifically calls into question basic truths about the world, 
such as the use of mathematics and statistics in order to find truth. 
 
When I asserted the probability of a given person experiencing the skeptical scenario, I 
assumed that it was no more likely to happen to one person than another. It is on this 
last point that Unger could take exception to: if the whole of the world is being called 
into question, the number of ‘real people’ might not be 6.77 billion. There might be 
only one person, there might be ten, there might be a million. As such, there might be a 
way to privilege certain observers in a way that would change the probability and we 
cannot know what probability we ought to use. Thus, we cannot (even limiting the 
space to human persons) specify a given probability for comparative analysis. But this 
is a false dilemma. If we are talking about the space of human beings, the space of 
human persons is subsumed by it and proportional to it within the ‘false world.’ This 
will be true regardless of what proportion of humans are ‘persons’ and so the 
probability for a given human being doesn’t change. We might assert that our own 
subjective experience is to be given a higher probability of making us ‘real persons’ but 
it is trivially true that Unger cannot assume this premise without further assuming that 
there is something real about subjective experience that makes it ‘real’ – a knowledge 
claim that he cannot make. In other words, it might be such that ‘non-real persons’ also 
have subjective experience, and as Unger cannot claim to know, he cannot prioritize 
any human in his example over any other. 
 
                                               
8
 This figure was gained by taking the number that reported delusions (2%) and subtracting out the 
proportion that would be diagnosable (12%). 
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But Unger can, unlike the inkwell scenario, call into question the possibility of the 
quantitative analysis being wrong. Even if the ‘voice’ uses Bayesian reasoning to 
convince us, it is also a product of the illusion and may merely be demonstrating a truth 
to us in a way that would allow us to understand it in our current state. As such, there is 
no reason to assume that this analysis pertains in the ‘real world’ of the scenario. I will 
grant the skeptic this, but note that our example ‘person’ is not in the ‘real world’ 
according to the skeptical version of this scenario. Instead he is in the world that may or 
may not be real and is in the unenviable position of having to judge whether or not he 
believes the voice to be legitimate or a delusion. Given the best information available to 
him, prior to being actually ‘taken away’ from the illusory world, quantitative 
comparisons still work as a better tool for understanding whether or not he should 
believe the voice over his past experiences, as he lacks access to whatever tools of 





We might then ask about specific uncertain worlds, such as Unger begins Ignorance 
with. We might, for instance, imagine that we are waking up to electrodes being 
removed from our head, and having it explained to us that everything we have 
experienced up to this point has been an illusion. As an aside, we might be told that 
rocks don’t exist in this new world. Perhaps we might speculate that quantitative 
analysis would also not prove true here, as would the existence of rocks.9 
 
Here I will concede to the skeptic that the scenario is beyond quantitative analysis. This 
is because the scenario cannot be expressed in terms of contrary models in any 
evidentiary fashion that would make a given scenario less probable- unlike the inkwell 
or the voice. To see why this is so, we might imagine 4 nearby possible worlds. In 
world A, a person experiences this scenario just as it is outlined by Unger. In world B, a 
person experiences the same thing, but unknown to them, they were in the ‘real world’ 
prior to waking up in the lab, and it is the lab that is the simulation. In world C, the 
same thing is again experienced, but both worlds are merely simulations taking place in 
another world. In world D, the same experience again happens, but is merely the result 
of a drug-induced hallucination. We might further speculate to other worlds, both 
skeptical and not, to consider. But for people finding themselves in such a scenario, 
there is no way for them to distinguish between these worlds: one could just as easily 





                                               
9
 Unger, 9-10 
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Conclusion 
 
It has been shown that, in cases that occur in or are under consideration in the world as 
it is perceived, quantitative analysis of skeptical scenarios provides us with knowledge 
claims that can be understood in terms of the scenario as presented. Further, it has been 
shown that this quantitative analysis avoids the skeptical critique of dogmatism by 
actively updating on evidence based on new information as it occurs. This technique is 
limited: the probabilities it provides cannot be taken to be ‘certainties’ but are useful for 
picking out the more likely scenario where applicable and minimally allowing us to 
make a knowledge claim regarding our uncertainty in a given scenario. This analysis is 
limited to this world or others where the rules of quantitative analysis apply: once the 
‘experience’ of other worlds is assumed, quantitative analysis loses its ability to 
function as a tool. As such, quantitative analysis cannot and does not challenge the 
skeptic’s main point about whether or not knowledge is possible, as it is premised in 
there being a world such that mathematical knowledge is viable. But in scenarios that 
call our colloquial concepts of ‘knowing’ into question, quantitative analysis acts as a 
better tool for understanding skeptical scenarios than the skeptical model itself. This 
shows that for these sorts of skeptical scenarios one can better rely on quantitative 
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